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WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES IN VIRGINIA
The concern of this discussion is the problem of fixing adequate dam-
ages for the loss of human life in a wrongful death action, and Virginia's
past and present attempt at offering a solution to that problem. The
discussion does not deal with the requirements of proof of the alleged
wrongful death but assumes, instead, that the requisite degree of negli-
gence on the part of the tortfeasor has been established.'
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
No right of recovery existed for the wrongful death of another in
England or America until Lord Campbell's Act was passed in England
in 1846. The Act declared that it was proper for the jury to allow the
qualified parties to recover "such damages as they may think propor-
tioned to the injury resulting from such death." 2 But the Act was sub-
sequently restricted, by the English courts, to the "pecuniary loss" of
the beneficiaries. Most American jurisdictions that adopted wrongful
death acts patterned their statutes after the English statute and took a
similar judicial approach.3 Virginia's judicial interpretation, however,
did not limit the jury to a consideration of pecuniary damages although
the Commonwealth had also patterned its wrongful death statute after
Lord Campbell's Act.4 In awarding "such damages as to it may seem
fair and just.. .," ' the jury was allowed to consider, in addition to the
pecuniary loss sustained by the statutory beneficiaries, the loss of de-
ceased's care, attention and society. The jury was instructed that they
could award such sum as they deemed fair and just as a solatium to the
beneficiaries for sorrow and mental anguish." Even though damages
1. The tortfeasor is liable under Virginia's wrongful death statute whenever his
wrongful act, neglect, or default, which has caused the death of another, is such
that if death had not ensued the party injured would have been entitled to maintain
an action for personal injuries. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-633 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
2. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846). See Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334
Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920 (1933).
3. See Lambert, Wrongful Death of a Child, 30 NACCA L.J. 188 (1964).
4. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 173 Va. 153, 159, 3 S.E.2d 172, 174
(1939). For an examination of the history of Virginia's Wrongful Death Act see
Hudson Motor Car Co. v. Hertz, 121 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 696 (1941).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
6. Matthews v. Hicks, 197 Va. 112, 119, 87 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1955).
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could not be recovered for the mental anguish and physical pain suffered
by the decedent from the time of his injury to the time of his death,
nor for any hospital, medical, or funeral expenses, they nevertheless
were allowed to be considered as elements of "fair and just" damages. 7
Virginia possessed one of the broadest views of wrongful death damages
found among American jurisdictions." Limited only by a statutory max-
imum amount recoverable,9 the amount of damages in a wrongful death
case was left almost exclusively to the discretion of the jury. The ver-
dict could not be reversed because damages were excessive, unless they
were so large as, under the circumstances, to shock one's sense of justice,
or to indicate that they were clearly the result of passion or prejudice
on the part of the jury.'0 Thus, the jury in Virginia, prior to 1968, had
virtual "free rein," up to a statutory limit, to consider all aspects of
the case and render an adequate verdict accordingly. Neither the death
of the wrongdoer" nor the death of the statutory beneficiaries abated
the cause of action.'2 In summary, until 1968, the Virginia statute
offered more elements of recovery than most jurisdictions, but set a
relatively conservative limit on the total amount recoverable. The se-
riousness of this limitation was illustrated in the 1954 case of United
States v. Guyer,13 in which the court, while considering the justification
of an $87,000 wrongful death award in Maryland, pointed out that had
the tragic death occurred twenty-five miles to the south (in Virginia),
the award would have been limited to $25,000. Indeed, the maximum
recovery is such a questionable aspect of both the past and present Vir-
ginia statute, that the final section of this article is devoted to a discus-
7. Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 1036, 154 S.E.2d 124, 127 (1967).
8. As of 1964 only four states, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, and West Virginia had
statutes which specifically allowed survivors to recover for mental suffering, sorrow
and bereavement. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRoNGF DEATH 230 (1966). In several
other states, such as Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia, whose death statutes
contain general language as to the measure of damages, a similar result has been
reached.
9. In VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (1950) the damages recoverable were limited to
$15,000. By ch. 60, [19521 Va. Acts, section 8-636 was amended to increase the
maximum amount recoverable to $25,000, and by ch. 387, [19581 Va. Acts, the
section was further amended to increase the maximum to $30,000. By ch. 430,
[1962] Va. Acts the maximum was further increased to $35,000, and ch. 583,
[1966] Va. Acts apparently increased the maximum to $40,000, although the last
sentence in the amended section implies the maximum figure to be $50,000.
10. Matthews v. Hicks, 197 Va. 112, 119, 87 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1955).
11. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-633 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
12. See ld. § 8-638.
13. 218 F.2d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 1954).
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sion advocating the abolition of a limitation upon the maximum recovery.
With a few exceptions,' 4 Virginia's original wrongful death statute,
enacted by the General Assembly in 1871, remained unchanged until
1968. The 1968 legislature made extensive changes in the statute,' 5 and
although an initial reading of the new provisions indicate that they are
perhaps unambiguous, a more careful examination reveals that there exist
problems in obtaining fair and just recoveries in certain situations. Since
only a few cases decided under the new statute have reached the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in order to resolve some of these
problems it will be necessary to analyze various decisions under the old
statute and to examine some decisions from other jurisdictions in light
of the 1968 statute.
SOLACE
Even though the 1968 statute increased Virginia's traditional limit on
damages from forty thousand dollars to seventy-five thousand, five hun-
dred dollars and actual hospital, medical and ambulance service expenses,
it restricted the amount awardable by the jury in each of three areas
of compensation. The jury may now award up to twenty-five thousand
dollars exclusively for solace and, if it chooses to do so, may apportion
that amount among designated classes of beneficiaries.' The measure
of damages is fixed, but the definition of solace is open to speculation.
Webster defines solace as: "the easing of grief; loneliness and discom-
fort." The comparable phrase in the four other states which specifically
allow survivors to recover for mental suffering, sorrow and bereavement
is "mental anguish." 17 The North Carolina Supreme Court in Hancock
14. The exceptions include:
(1) Increasing the statute of limitations from one to two years (1958);
(2) slight changes in the class beneficiaries;
(3) successive increases in the maximum amounts recoverable, see note 9 supra.
15. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
16. Before the 1968 amendment, section 8-636 classified beneficiaries into two
classes: the first included the surviving spouse, children and grandchildren of the
deceased; the second was comprised of the parents, brothers and sisters of the
deceased. No member of the second class could recover if a member of the first
survived, and the jury was given discretion to distribute damages among members
of the same class. The 1968 amendment retains this classification for purposes of
distributing damages for solace. If the jury chooses not to apportion the recovery
for solace among the class beneficiaries, this apportionment is made by the trial
judge. He may hear evidence for this purpose if deemed necessary. VA. CODE ANN.
5 8-638 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
17. See Page, Danages for Wrongful Death-Broadening View of Pecuniary Loss,
30 NACCA L. J. 217 (1964).
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v. Western Union Tel. Co.,'8 stated that there is a material difference
between disappointment, regret, and the keen mental suffering signified
by the words "mental anguish." In an Arkansas case, the court held that
mental anguish meant something more than the normal grief occasioned
by the loss of a loved one. The court believed that to be grieved or
shocked by the death of a loved one is natural, but in order to recover
for mental anguish, one must suffer more than the "normal" grief. 9
Legally, there is a fine but significant line that divides the emotional
response, or mental anguish and hurt, of the survivors from the actual
loss by the beneficiaries of the decedent's companionship and society.
Only the former is compensated in a recovery for solace.20 In fact, the
loss of companionship and society is actually considered an element of
pecuniary loss in many states.21 Much the same proof would be used
for both areas, but where, as in Virginia, the statute limits the amount
recoverable for solace, the jury can conceivably increase the proven
pecuniary loss by compensating for loss of companionship and society
where the projected pecuniary loss is below the statutory maximum.
It is the emotional response or mental anguish of the beneficiaries which
the statute is seeking to compensate. But unlike personal injury cases there
can be no recovery under the wrongful death statute for the pain and
mental anguish of the decedent between the time of his fatal injury and
the time of his death. The mental anguish of the beneficiaries may be
increased by the mental and physical suffering of the decedent, but it is
their mental anguish and not the physical pain and mental anguish of
the decedent for which recovery is allowed.22
After establishing the meaning of solace, the next question involves
proving it. A 1967 Virginia case held that suffering and sorrow by the
decedent's beneficiaries need not be proved, the jury having a right to
infer such suffering and sorrow as a result of the death.u3 But this was
prior to the 1968 statute, and there was no way of knowing for what
reason or for which category the jury was actually awarding the dam-
18. 137 N.C. 497, 498,49 S.E. 952, 953 (1905).
19. Peugh v. Oliger, 233 Ark. 281, 290, 345 S.XvV.2d 610, 617 (1961).
20. See Address by Charles F. Krause, Virginia Trial Lawyers' Association, Tenth
Annual Seminar (March 15, 1969), in VIRGMnIA TwRAL LAWYERS ASSOCATION, PROCEEDINGS
oF Th TFrm ANNuAL SFmNAR 114-126 (1969).
21. There is a definite trend in many states, whose wrongful death acts call for
a pecuniary loss test, to permit recovery for loss of such items as society and com-
panionship, albeit on a "pecuniary" basis. Page, supra note 17.
22. Virginia Iron Co. v. Odle, 128 Va. 280, 309-10, 105 S.Y. 107, 116 (1920).
23. Gamble v. Hill, 208 Va. 171, 179, 156 S.2d 888, 894 (1967).
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ages. With the express provision in the present statute that up to twenty-
five thousand dollars may be awarded for solace,24 there appears to be
a requirement of some evidence, such as proof of close emotional ties,
before a jury might award damages purportedly for the express purpose
of compensating mental anguish and grief on the part of the statutory
beneficiaries.25 This evidence would be necessary to prevent windfalls
in certain situations, or circumvention of the purpose of the statute
through punitive awards against an aggravated wrongdoer in accordance
with the degree of his culpability. 6 Of course, "the extent of the distress
and sorrow may not be susceptible of direct or exact measurement, but
enough certainty and knowledge of the situation can be established
through the introduction of testimony in order to furnish a basis for the
verdict or judgment." 27
The need for such a control 28 might be illustrated by a situation in
which the decedent and beneficiary were a childless married couple wh6
had fought constantly and developed a deep hatred toward one another.
There was no longer any love or affection between them, and at the
time of decedent's death they had irreconcilably separated, although they
were not yet divorced.2 9 No matter how negligent the defendant had
acted, the surviving spouse certainly should not be able to recover for
solace.
Once the proper evidence is determined, the problem becomes the
practical one of bringing these facts to the jury's attention. In Basham
v. Terry,3 0 the court agreed that, if the plaintiff offers testimony as to
the decedent's good conduct and happy relations with his family in order
to enhance a solace award, the defendant can refute this testimony with
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (Supp. 1970).
25. It should not be presumed that one person is aggrieved by the death of another
in the absence of proof that in fact, that is the case. S. SPEISER, supra note 8, at 232.
26. Punitive or exemplary damages may not be recovered in an action brought under
the Virginia wrongful death act. Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 1038, 154 S.E.2d
124, 129 (1967).
27. Graham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, - , 34 So. 91, 93 (1903).
28. The statute seeks to control jury speculation, false claims, and verdicts based on
passion by limiting recovery to certain class beneficiaries and setting a maximum value
on an otherwise immeasurable element. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (Supp. 1970).
29. See Porter v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 183 Va. 108, 31 S.E.2d 337 (1944).
Regardless of desertion, abandonment, or adultery, as long as the surviving consort
was decedents lawful husband or wife at the time of decedent's death, the surviving
consort may recover for wrongful death. But see Matthews v. Hicks, 197 Va. 112,
87 S.E.2d 629 (1955). Evidence of desertion and adultery of the surviving spouse are
admissible on the issue of quantum of damages, unless the evidence clearly shows that a
reconciliation has been entered into, in good faith.
30. 199 Va. 817, 824-25, 102 S.E.2d 285, 290 (1958).
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evidence of the decedent's bad habits and unhappy relationship with
his family. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff offers no evidence of good
relations, the court may determine that an award for solace would be
without basis,3' or it may follow the precedent set by decisions under the
old statute that suffering and sorrow may be inferred from the death.32
In all probability, however, the court will allow the jury to infer sorrow
and suffering in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. 3 In view
of the fact that such a presumption of sorrow and suffering may exist,
Gamble v. HilP4 would seem to indicate that the defendant, even in the
absence of any positive evidence by the plaintiff, may offer evidence of
the decedent's moral delinquencies, bad conduct, or unhappy relations
with his family. But Gamble suggests this may only be done if defendant
can go further and show that, because of such characteristics and con-
duct, the statutory beneficiaries lacked affection for him or that dece-
dent's death brought them no sorrow or mental anguish. Thus, unless
the defendant can show a lack of love and affection, evidence other than
rebuttal evidence of decedent's character and conduct is not relevant
to solace damages. 35
No RECOVERY FOR DECEDENT'S ESTATE
Under the old statute, the action for "fair and just damages" did not
abate upon the death of the last beneficiary member of the class for the
personal representative could still initiate or continue the action.30 Ac-
cording to the Virginia Code, the amounts received were "assets in the
hands of the personal representative to be disposed of according to
law." 37 Presumably, this meant that recovery by the personal represen-
31. See note 25 supra.
32. Gamble v. Hill, 208 Va. 171, 179, 156 S.E.2d 888, 894 (1967).
33. Graham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903). The mental
suffering by a parent upon the loss of a child may be assumed in the absence of
facts and circumstances tending to disprove the same.
34. 208 Va. 171, 179, 156 S.E.2d 888, 894 (1967). The gist of the proferred evidence
showed that this girl had been guilty of immoral conduct and illicit relations, was the
mother of one illegitimate child and was about to become the mother of another. But
such evidence was not allowed since it fell short of proving or tending to prove that
the decedents beneficiaries had lost affection for her or had suffered no sorrow or
mental anguish by reason of her death.
35. There is a conflict of authority on the question in other jurisdictions. Id. at 178,
156 S.E.2d at 893.
36. Johns v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 199 Va. 63, 65, 97 S.E.2d 723, 725 (1957).
37. VA. CoDE AN-N. § 8-638 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
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tative in the absence of statutory beneficiaries was for the benefit of
the decedent's general estate.88
The 1968 amendment to section 8-636 provides that "no recovery
hereunder shall be deemed to be assets of the estate of the decedent
.... ,, 39 In all probability this provision refers only to the sums recovered
by the beneficiaries or dependents pursuant to section 8-636, insuring
that such awards go directly to these beneficiaries or dependents un-
touched by the decedent's creditors.40 If this is the extent of the pro-
vision, then it is merely an incorporation of the clause in section 8-638
protecting any recovery by the statutory beneficiaries from "all debts
and liabilities of the deceased." However, if the provision is also appli-
cable to the situation where there are no beneficiaries or dependents, it
appears to prevent the personal representative from recovering more
than five hundred dollars plus the decedent's actual immediate hospital,
medical and ambulance expenses. This interpretation, however, creates
a conflict with section 8-638 which allows the personal representative
to recover in the absence of statutory beneficiaries. Under Virginia law,
however, where the legislature amends a statute by adding a new pro-
vision, the presumption is that it was intended to make some change in
existing law.4 It is also settled in Virginia that where inconsistent and
irreconcilable provisions are found in statutes, effect must be given "to
the latest expression of the legislative intent." 42 Hence, this new pro-
vision, if applicable to such a situation, means that, regardless of a show-
ing of extreme grief by some distant relatives of the decedent, the death
of the last class beneficiary before recovery terminates the right of
recovery for solace. If there are also no surviving dependents, there
can be no recovery for pecuniary loss, thus limiting the personal repre-
sentative in such cases to a recovery of five hundred dollars and the
decedent's actual hospital, medical and ambulance expenses. This con-
clusion appears justified since the statute bases recovery on solace and
pecuniary loss as elements of recovery which are not entirely consistent
with a recovery by the personal representative where there are no bene-
ficiaries or dependents. Nevertheless, even in the absence of statutory
beneficiaries and dependents, an action would still lie in every wrongful
38. See generally Johns v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 199 Va. 63, 97 S.E.2d 723 (1957).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (Supp. 1970).
40. See Grady v. Irvine, 254 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 1958).
41. City of Richmond v. Sutherland, 114 Va. 688, 77 S.E. 470 (1913).
42. Williamson v. Wellman, 156 Va. 417, 430, 158 S.E. 777, 781 (1931); accord,
Adkins v. Arnold, 235 U.S. 417, 421 (1914).
[Vol. 12:396
WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES
death case, because the cause of action and the right to enforce it are
bestowed upon the personal representative and not upon a beneficiary
or any class of beneficiaries.
If the above interpretation of this provision is correct, two objections,
both favoring the defendant, immediately become apparent. Since finding
an attorney to take the plaintiff's case on a contingency basis will neces-
sarily be more difficult when there is no hope of recovery beyond five
hundred dollars for funeral expenses and actual hospital, medical and
ambulance expenses, the result will be a decrease in the number of negli-
gent defendants who are civilly prosecuted under the statute. Further,
a defendant, whose wrongful act has eliminated an entire family, will be
in a better position than one, who, through negligence or criminal in-
clination, has killed a single member of the family and left surviving
dependents and beneficiaries. On the other hand, to allow additional
recovery in the absence of statutory' beneficiaries would invite false
claims by distant relatives, create additional problems of measurement of
damages, and facilitate the temptation to punish the defendant by assess-
ing punitive damages.
FUm.AL, MEDICAL AND AMBULANCE EXPENSES
To abolish one harsh rule which resulted from judicial interpretation
of the old statute'45 the new act now allows the personal representative
of the deceased person "to recover the actual funeral expenses of the
decedent, not exceeding five hundred dollars, and the actual hospital,
medical and ambulance service expenses incurred by the decedent as
a result of the wrongful act."40 Practicing attorneys will welcome the
addition of funeral, medical and hospital expenses as an available element
of damages, but may find it somewhat puzzling that the funeral expenses
are limited to five hundred dollars. There are, however, several reasons
43. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-633 (Rep1. Vol. 1957) states that
whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act,
neglect, or default of any person . . . and the act ... is such as would,
if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain
an action ... then, and in every case, the person who ... would, have
been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for
damages.... [Emphasis added].
44. VA. CODE ANNi¢. § 8-634 (Repl.Vol. 1957).
45. Prior to the 1968 amendment, hospital, medical and funeral expenses were held
not to be recoverable in an action for wrongful death. Conrad v. Thompson, 195 Va.
714, 721, 80 SE.2d 561, 566 (1964).
46. VA. Coan ANN. § 8-636 (Supp. 1970).
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why the legislature may have set the limit at a figure which scarcely
approaches today's funeral expenses. First, there is the argument that
the defendant's wrongful act merely advanced the time when payment
of funeral expenses would be due, and did not create a new expense
since death is inevitable.47 The five hundred dollars could merely be
intended to compensate for the extra expense of having to pay for the
funeral prematurely.4 Also, the legislature may have desired to guard
against the expense of unnecessarily elaborate funerals without forcing
the courts to consider time consuming proof of the reasonableness of
the burial expenses or whether the funeral was in keeping with the social
position or standing of the deceased in the community. Nevertheless,
funeral expenses are a direct result of the wrongful death and, as a matter
of justice, should be considered an item of damages suffered by the per-
son liable to pay them.49
The remainder of this provision provides that the personal represen-
tative is entitled to recover the actual hospital, medical and ambulance
service expenses incident to the decedent's fatal injury.50 In other words,
upon putting the bills for these expenses into evidence and proving their
validity, the jury, upon finding defendant liable, must award the personal
representative a recovery equal to the total of these expenses. If the
evidence is sufficient and the jury does not award an amount equal to
these expenses, the personal representative would seem to have grounds
for setting aside the verdict as contrary to the law and evidence. If,
however, the personal representative, through oversight or inability, is
unable to adequately prove the full extent of these expenses, any award
received for the three expenses is distributed pro rata among the creditors
to whom these expenses are owed, without regard to the fact that only
five hundred dollars was recovered for the funeral expenses. As with
all of the damages which may be recovered under this act, the jury
should not consider any benefits that may have been received from
collateral sources, such as insurance policies.51
PEC-UNIARY Loss
Finally, the "jury may award such further damages, not exceeding
fifty thousand dollars, as shall equal the financial or pecuniary loss sus-
47. Consolidated Traction Co. v. Hone, 60 N.JJ.. 444, 38 A. 759 (1897).
48. See generally Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914).
49. S. Spmsmi, supra note 8, at 241.
50. VA. Cons Aw. § 8-636 (Supp. 1970).
51. Walthew v. Davis, 201 Va. 557, 111 S.E.2d 784 (1960).
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tained by the dependent or dependents of such decedent and shall fur-
ther direct in what proportions such damages shall be distributed to such
dependents, regardless of class." 62 It is significant that the compensa-
tion to be awarded under this provision is to the dependents rather than
to the class beneficiaries designated in the solatium provision. How-
ever, in the great majority of cases, a dependent of the decedent would
also be one of those persons designated in the solatium provision. Where
this is the case, the rule as to exclusion of the deferred class in favor of
the preferred class that was binding on the jury in the awarding of dam-
ages for solace is not applicable in the financial or pecuniary loss provi-
sion. The jury is allowed to apportion the pecuniary loss award to
whomever it believes has suffered the greatest financial loss by depriva-
tion of the decedent's continued existence. This should be true even if
the recipient of part or all of the award is a dependent who is a distant
relative or no relation at all. The validity of this conclusion depends
upon the interpretation of the provision allowing dependents to recover
"regardless of class." These words could mean that such dependents
may recover regardless of whether they are in the preferred or de-
ferred class of designated beneficiaries, or regardless of whether they
are in a class or not. This matter, and indeed the extent of the entire
provision, ultimately depends on the interpretation given to the word
"dependents" as used in section 8-636.
In most wrongful death statutes allowing recovery for pecuniary loss,
dependency is not expressly required but is merely "an evidentiary fact
from which, with other circumstances of the case, the question of pecuni-
ary injury and its extent is to be ascertained." " But where, as in the Vir-
ginia statute, only dependents may recover for pecuniary loss, substan-
tially different results depend on whether the definition of the word
"dependent" includes actual financial dependency or dependency of an
emotional, psychological or companionship nature as well. In general,
all that the word implies is a need on the part of the beneficiary and a
recognition of that need on the part of the decedent.5 It is not neces-
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (Supp. 1970).
53. See note 16 supra.
54. Faulkner v. Faulkner, 186 Ark. 1082, - , 57 S.W.2d 818, 822 (1933). Except for
Massachusetts and Alabama, which base their wrongful death statutes on punitive
awards, all states base recovery on compensation to the surviving beneficiaries, basically
for pecuniary loss. The only other states which require a beneficiary to be a dependent
are Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, and
Washington. S. SPEISER, supra note 8, at 583 n.14.
55. Wente v. Shaver, 350 Mo. 1143, 169 S.W.2d 947 (1943).
19701
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:396
sary, in order to render one "dependent" within the meaning of the
usual statute, that he or she be totally dependent upon the deceased for
support." A partial dependency is sufficient, as where a child contributes
materially and substantially to the support of a parent.57 Dependency
may also be established through the services rendered by decedent for
the claimant's maintenance even in the absence of actual monetary con-
tributions.5 8 Therefore, the majority of jurisdictions dealing with de-
pendency as a statutory requisite hold that the test is not whether the
alleged dependent could maintain himself without decedent's help. The
test, rather, is whether the decedent actually contributed substantially,
by money or services, to support of the claimant's standard of living
or standard of maintenance in respect to "necessaries and conveniences"
before his, the decedent's, death.5 9
If Virginia is to follow the majority rule among the states requiring
dependency for recovery, the following conclusions must be drawn from
the pecuniary loss provision of the Virginia statute. First, the recovery
of pecuniary loss is not patently restricted to the dependents that dece-
dent claimed on his last income tax return nor to the statutory bene-
ficiaries eligible to recover for solace. Secondly, since maintenance, de-
pendency and support are obviously matters of degree, it will be for the
jury in difficult cases60 to draw the line separating surviving relatives of
56. Kirpatrick v. Bowyer, 131 Ind. App. 86, 169 N.E.2d 409 (1960).
57. See Correia v. Van Camp Sea Food Co., 113 Cal. App. 2d 71, -, 248 P.2d 81, 91
(1952) where the court held that the word "dependent" is broader in scope than
actual dependency when referring to those eligible for a recovery for wrongful death
under the Jones Act. A right of recovery is not dependent upon reliance for neces-
saries, but a person is "dependent" upon another when he has the moral right to rely
and does rely upon such other person for support, whether in whole or in part.
58, Carianni v. Schwenker, 38 N.J. Super. 350, 118 A.2d 847 (1955). See also
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Lutz, 64 Ind. App. 663, 116 N.E. 429 (1917) where the
decedent mother kept house for the claimant, cooked for him and looked after his
clothes.
59. See Carianni v. Schwenker, 38 N.J. Super. 350, 118 A.2d 847 (1955) (the fact that
a mother washed clothes, fixed meals, did the dishes, housework and shopping for her
husband and three adult daughters should be submitted to the jury for their determi-
nation as to whether or not the husband and daughters were dependents of their
deceased mother); Wells-Dickey Trust Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry, 166 Minn. 79, 207
N.W. 186 (1926), rev'd on other grounds, 275 U.S. 161 (1927) (adopted as the test
of dependency actual support rather than inability on the part of the alleged de-
pendent to earn a livelihood). Contra, Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 So. 876 (1894)
holding that dependency implies an actual inability to support oneself and an actual
dependence upon decedent for support.
60. See Carianni v. Schwenker, 38 N.J. Super. 350, 359, 118 A.2d 847, 853 (1955). It
is for the jury to take into consideration the extent to which the claimant's standard
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the decedent who are dependents from those who may sustain "pecuniary
injuries" as a result of the death but who are, nevertheless, not dependent,
in whole or in part. And, thirdly, recovery for pecuniary loss upon the
death of a child or an elderly person will rarely be allowed because of
the difficulty in proving that a person was substantially dependent upon
that child or elderly person for his standard of living.
The facts which will be admissible to calculate the financial or pe-
cuniary loss to the dependents must be determined by an examination
of allowable elements of proof under the old statute. This may cause
difficulty because the old statute allowed "fair and just" damages, and
pecuniary loss was only one element, according to the courts' interpre-
tation of the statute. Naturally, the courts were not overly concerned
with delineating the boundaries of pecuniary loss since anything that
remotely resembled a financial loss could be termed a fair and just dam-
age under the broad and permissive language of the statute. 1
The general rule under the old statute was that pecuniary loss sus-
tained by the statutory beneficiaries included the probable earnings of
the deceased for the duration of his life expectancy in view of his health,
age, business capacity and experience.6 Cases have added as elements
of jury consideration the deceased's physical and mental capacity,63
habits," and energy and perseverance.65 With these considerations in
mind, the jury could receive evidence of the amount of decedent's
annual salary or wages,"" and use, as a multiplier, the probable number
of years that deceased would have lived. Instructions under the old
statute did not compel the jury to take into account the number of years
that the deceased would have earned a diminished salary or no salary at
all, or the sum that should be deducted from his salary for his own per-
sonal expenses, or the probable life span of the beneficiaries.68 Though
of living may have declined consequent upon the decedents death. This kind of factual
issue is not to be determined by the court unless the alleged dependency is so in-
significant in degree that reasonable men could not fairly disagree as to its insub-
stantiality.
61. Cf. Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 578, 90 S.E.2d 171, 175 (1955).
62. Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 1037, 154 S.E.2d 124, 128 (1967).
63. Whitaker v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 296 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1961), aff'g 195
F. Supp. 420 (ED. Va. 1961).
64. Cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Lumpkins, 151 Va. 173, 144 S.E. 485 (1928).
65. Jones v. Richmond, 118 Va. 612, 88 SE. 82 (1916).
66. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Wrightman's Adn'r, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 431 (1877).
67. See generally Colonial Coal Co. v. Gass, 144 Va. 24, 75 S.E. 775 (1912).
68. In ascertaining damages for the death of a son, upon whom the mother was
dependent, the jury might consider what would probably have been the lifespan of the
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it was not essential to introduce mortality tables to show the probable
duration of the life of the deceased, 9 introduction of such scientific
tables was permissible.70
These are considerations that the Virginia courts have held to be rele-
vant in proving the direct financial loss sustained by dependents in the
usual case where the deceased was the family breadwinner. 71 For the
most part, these rules will remain the same, since there is no doubt that
the loss of his financial support is a pecuniary loss to the dependents. A
problem arises, though, upon considering whether or not compensation
can be recovered for such collateral areas of pecuniary loss as depriva-
tion of guidance, advice, assistance, comfort, and protection.
Prior to 1968, the stereotype jury instructions in Virginia allowed a
recovery for "fair and just" damages to include loss of deceased's care,
attention and society in addition to any pecuniary loss.72 This indicates
that loss of society and companionship, less "sentimental" 73 than grief
and sorrow, and which has been shown to be distinguishable from what
is being compensated in the award for solace, was not considered an
element of pecuniary loss prior to the enactment of the 1968 statute.
An analysis of Virginia cases prior to 1968, however, indicates that the
phrase "pecuniary loss," when used in a jury instruction was to be given
a liberal interpretation.74 A 1928 Virginia case,75 cited with approval
the United States Supreme Court's opinion, in No-folk & W. Ry. v.
mother if her son had not been killed. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Noell's Adm'r, 73
Va. (32 Gratt.) 394 (1879).
69. Eisenhower v. Jeter, 205 Va. 159, 135 S.E.2d 786 (1964). See also Gough v.
Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 90 S.E.2d 171 (1955). The age, sex, health and mental capacity of
a decedent being proved, the jury is entitled to judge his life expectancy without the
aid of mortality tables.
70. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Cheatwood, 103 Va. 356, 49 S.E. 489 (1905).
71. Other factors to be taken into consideration include the difference in
receiving the money in one lump sum as opposed to it being earned over many years,
and the earning power of that lump sum of money. Also, evidence of earnings usually
comes in the form of gross figures which do not reflect the ordinary payroll deduc-
tions. Kent, Damages in Wrongful Death Actions, 17 CLEv-MAR. L. REv. 233, 238 (1968).
For a detailed discussion of the techniques and elements of proof in such cases, and
the theories of plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys in the use of expert economists to
project a family's financial loss, see Address by Edward J. Simarski, Virginia Trial
Lawyers' Association Tenth Annual Seminar (March 15, 1969), in VIRGINIA TRIAL
LAWYERs AssociATioN, PROCEEDINGS OF THE T.NTH ANNUAL SEMINAR 126-140 (1969).
72. Breeding v. Johnson, 208 Va. 652, 159 S.E.2d 836 (1968).
73. Page, supra note 17.
74. Eisenhower v. Jeter, 205 Va. 159, 135 S.E.2d 786 (1964).
75. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Lumpkins, 151 Va. 173, 144 S.E. 485 (1928).
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Holbrook76 that the jury might take into consideration "the care, atten-
tion, instruction, training, advice, and guidance... which the evidence
showed the deceased reasonably might be expected to give his children
during their minority" in considering pecuniary loss. In 1955, Gough
v. Shaner defined the phrase "pecuniary loss" as not only financial loss,
present and prospective loss of services, nurture and care, and other
advantages but also benefits of a pecuniary nature which had been cut
off or would probably be lost in the future by reason of the death.77
It is imperative to remember that, in the pre-1968 cases, the phrase
"pecuniary loss" was created by the court to assist the jury in assessing
"fair and just damages"; it was not a statutory limitation. Now that
"financial or pecuniary loss" is a statutory limitation on damages, the
meaning of the phrase calls for further delineation by the courts in order
that the statutory criteria may be uniformly applied. The courts must
decide whether pecuniary loss, as used in section 8-636, includes com-
pensation for those peripheral areas which are not, perhaps, strictly
pecuniary, but yet do not fall under the heading of grief and sorrow.
To allow recovery for such losses would be in line with a definite trend
in many jurisdictions to interpret pecuniary loss statutes more liberally,
thereby allowing recovery not only for actual pecuniary loss of contri-
butions and services but also "for loss of advice, comfort, assistance and
protection which the jury might find to be of pecuniary value and which
the survivor could reasonably have expected if the decedent had lived." 78
This trend, however, to liberalize the definition of pecuniary loss is
occurring in jurisdictions where pecuniary loss to the survivors is the
only basis for recovery. It has been utilized, almost exclusively, in cases
where the decedent was so old or so young that there was little or no
reliable evidence of loss when strictly applying the pecuniary standard,
yet justice seemed to demand at least some recovery.
In practice, it is seldom necessary in the usual case of the deceased
breadwinner to argue that parental guidance and advice, or marital
assistance and protection, are proper elements of pecuniary loss under
the Virginia statute. Where a thirty or forty year old man with two or
three children and a ten thousand dollar annual income is killed, one
would not have to stretch the definition of pecuniary injury in order to
project a direct and acute pecuniary loss of over fifty thousand dollars
76. 235 U.S. 625, 628 (1914) (concerned the Federal Employers' Liability Act of
1908, 35 Stat. 65, which allowed recovery only for pecuniary loss).
77. 197 Va. 572, 579, 90 S.E.2d 171,176 (1955).
78. Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, - , 113 N.W2d 355, 363 (1961).
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to his family.79 But in the case of the wrongful death of a child or a
housewife and mother, the definition of pecuniary loss becomes very
pertinent in determining if more than solace damages can be recovered.
The main obstacle, in recovering for the pecuniary injury suffered in
such a death, is the existence of a statutory dependent who is eligible
to recover. As was pointed out earlier, authorities considering the ques-
tion have supported the conclusion that dependency in this type of
statute is the support, contributions, or even services ° upon which that
dependent had come to rely. 1
Assuming that the dependency requirement can be satisfied, it ap-
pears that more than the mere twenty-five thousand dollars for solace
could certainly be recovered for the death of a wife. Where she is sur-
vived by children, the expense to the surviving spouse of providing
the children with a home, the services of a suitable person to manage
the home and minister to the children's needs, or render domestic help,
would certainly be direct pecuniary losses.82 Even where there are no
children, courts have held that the pecuniary loss should not be limited
to the cost of a menial servant, or to what the wife would have earned
working for another, or to a combination of the two. On the contrary,
there should be recovery for the value of her services in counseling,
advising, inspiring, comforting, and otherwise serving her husband based
on the type of person she is shown to have been. 3 But an early Virginia
case seemed to discount consideration of the loss of these latter "serv-
ices" as pecuniary injuries suffered by the husband, referring to them as
a "proper element.., to be considered by the jury in fixing the sola-
tium to be awarded to the husband." 84 Certainly the pecuniary value
of the services rendered in the maintenance of a home and family, 5
however, ought not only to qualify her surviving husband and children
as dependents but also to entitle them to substantial damages under the
pecuniary loss provision, in addition to whatever they may recover for
solace.
79. Krause, supra note 20, at 124.
80. See Atlanta & C. Air-Line Ry. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369, 20 SE. 550 (1893).
81. See note 59 supra.
82. Legate v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Fla. 1961). See Spence, Demon-
strative Evidence, Wrongful Death and Survivorship, NACCA SIXTr CIRCUIT SEMINAR
(Beall ed. 1958) discussing in detail trial preparation of action for death of devoted
twenty-five year old housewife with two young children; $155,000 award.
83. Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153, 164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
84. Simmons v. McConnell, 86 Va. 494, 497, 10 S.E. 838, 839 (1890).
85. See THm AMERICAN HoME Jan. 11, 1959 containing an article documenting and
evaluating the total weekly value of the housewife's services at $193.95.
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The problem of finding a basis for pecuniary damages has been espe-
cially controversial in cases concerning the wrongful death of a child.
Formerly, many courts, after looking at the statistics concerning a child's
earning capacity and the cost of raising him,86 have decided rather
matter-of-factly that a child's death was actually a financial gain to the
family not a loss, and consequently have allowed only a nominal recov-
ery to the deceased child's parents. Gradually, the harshness of this rule,
which made wrongful death statutes almost nugatory in the case of
children, was eased as the courts either broadened the meaning of
pecuniary loss87 or created presumptions of pecuniary loss 8 in an at-
tempt to allow meaningful recoveries. Ultimately, a Michigan court not
only held loss of companionship to be an element of pecuniary loss to
the parents, but suggested further that the parents could recover for
their "lost investment" in the child.8 9
Even in Virginia, where the statute provided for other elements of
compensable loss, the courts were prone to formulate a broad and
inclusive definition of pecuniary loss in these cases. The jury was al-
lowed to consider any pecuniary loss sustained by the statutory bene-
ficiaries in the wrongful death of a child, "fixing such sum with refer-
ence to the probable earnings of the deceased child, taking into consid-
eration his age, intelligence, and health, during what would have been
his probable life time, if he had not been killed." 90 This was the approved
jury instruction even if it was not shown the amount of money the
child had earned or how much he contributed to the support of his
family. 1
Since no inflexible mathematical rule has been laid down by the 1968
statute for determining pecuniary loss, the elements which the jury may
consider in computing pecuniary loss are still within the discretion of
86. For a discussion showing that a child uses more money than he makes during
minority, see L. DUBLIN & A. LOTKA, TBB MoNEY VALUE OF A MAN (1946).
87. See Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961), where the court
held that the word "pecuniary" should be extended to embrace elements of the child's
society or companionship, not those of a purely sentimental significance, but the
child's advice, comfort, assistance and protection which the fact finder might conclude
were of pecuniary value.
88. See Immel v. Richards, 154 Ohio St. 52, 93 N.E.2d 474 (1950), where the court
upheld a five thousand dollar verdict for the death of a nine month old infant on
the presumption of pecuniary injury, since it would be impractical to offer direct evi-
dence of any specific loss occasioned by the death of a child of such tender years.
89. Wycko v. Gnodrke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
90. Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 577, 90 S.E.2d 171, 175 (1955).
91. Cooke v. Griggs, 183 Va. 851, 33 S.E.2d 764 (1945).
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the Virginia courts. Although there is nothing to indicate that the
definition of pecuniary loss is to be less comprehensive than previously
defined by the courts, the restriction on the remedy is in the requirement
that recovery be had only by the dependents. This will eliminate any
recovery for the death of a child, or an elderly person, under the pe-
cuniary loss provision except in the unusual situation where the dece-
dent's parents are actually dependent on him within the meaning of the
statute.
92
The Virginia statute, through the solace provision, takes a realistic
approach to the problem of finding an equitable means of compensating
the parents of a deceased child. Rather than manufacture formulae or
legal fictions to determine a basis for pecuniary injury recovery, the
statute recognizes the truth that the loss through the death of such
persons is one of love and affection rather than of money.
AN ARGumENT FOR ABOLISHING MAXIMUM RECOvERY
Virginia belongs to a dwindling minority of states which still limit
recovery in wrongful death actions to a statutory maximum. 3 A recog-
nition of the trend toward abolishing such arbitrary limitations, and the
consideration of the fact that the constitutions of nine states now em-
phatically forbid any such limitation,.9 4 should indicate to the General
Assembly the growing resentment towards such limitations. A subse-
quent examination of the rationale behind a statutory limitation leads
to the conclusion that the maximum recovery limitation should be abol-
ished in Virginia.
First, in the group which opposes removal of limitations on the
amount recoverable, there are the insurance companies who warn that
this would result in excessive jury verdicts and a resulting increase in
insurance rates. Of course, insurance rates probably would increase
upon removal of the limitation, but it is not the purpose of the law to
keep insurance premiums to a minimum. "The function of insurance is
92. See Correia v. Van Camp Sea Food, 113 Cal. App. 2d 71, - , 248 P.2d 81, 91
(1952).
93. In 1913, twenty states had limitations on the amount that could be recovered in
wrongful death actions. In 1965, only twelve states still had such restrictions. S. SPEISFR,
supfra note 8, at 490. In 1967, Illinois, Oregon and South Dakota dropped their limi-
tations leaving only nine states with statutory maximums. id. at 56 (Supp. 1969).
94. Aiuz. CoNsT. art. 18, § 6; ARK. CoNsT. art. 5, S 32; Ky. CONST. § 54; N. Y. CoNsr.
art. 1, § 18; Omo CoNsr. art. 1, § 19a; OKLA. CoNSr. art. 23, § 7; PA. CONST. art. 3,
S 21; UTAH CONST. art. 16, § 5; Wyo. CoNsr. art. 10, § 4.
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to shift the risk of loss and if it is necessary to raise insurance rates to
protect the public adequately from such serious consequences, then the
public should insist that such protection be provided." 95 Furthermore,
such increase in rates is certain to be minimal, based upon experience
in the great majority of states which have no limitations on recovery 0
The danger of strong feelings of sympathy by the jury in death ac-
tions accounts in part for the legislature's imposition of maximum limi-
tations on allowable damages. But since the arbitrary limitation may in
some situations prevent a plaintiff from receiving damages which he
has adequately proved, it appears that there must be better ways of
controlling the awards. Restricting recovery to dependents, a control
employed by the new Virginia statute,97 is one of the better means. The
statute should also require proof of close emotional ties and suffering
of more than "ordinary grief" in order to allow recovery for solace.
Another way to limit excessive jury verdicts would be a stricter exer-
cise of judicial review of jury verdicts in light of the facts of each individ-
ual case.98 This approach has been used effectively in the personal injury
area, and proponents of the limitation on recoveries under the wrongful
death act are hard pressed to find any logical differences between wrong-
ful death recoveries and personal injury recoveries which would warrant
a limitation on the recovery in the former but not the latter. No limita-
tions are placed on recoveries for personal injuries or for property dam-
age, yet a damage estimation is often quite speculative. This disparity
could result in a situation in which more could be recovered for the
negligent killing of an animal, such as a valuable race horse, than for
the death of a man caused by the same act of negligence.99 In personal
injury cases, the danger of jury sympathy is often just as prevalent, and
it cannot logically be argued that an award for pain and suffering of
the injured person is any less conjectural than an award for solace or
mental anguish suffered by the decedent's family.
There are many other reasons for abolishing an arbitrary ceiling for
wrongful death damages. It is completely illogical for the beneficiaries
to be denied adequate recovery merely because of the place in which
95. Note, Wrongful Death Limitations in Oregon-A Rational Result or a Historical
Mistake, 1 WLLA mETIz L.J. 616, 624-25 (1961).
96. S. SPEISER, supra note 8, at 491.
97. See VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-636 (Supp. 1970).
98. See United States v. Guyer, 218 F.2d "266 "(4th Cir. 1954).
99. Note, supra note 95, at 620 n.28.
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their decedent's death occurred.'00 Also, this ceiling gives the defendant
an advantage in settlement negotiations. If the defendants did not know
that plaintiffs in wrongful death cases were shackled by limited recov-
eries, there would be more defendants willing to settle out of court,
thus eliminating much court congestion.'"' In the face of all these argu-
ments, the maximum limitation remains the most criticized aspect in the
1968 amendment. At least for now, the old adage that it is often cheaper
for the tortfeasor to kill his victim than to maim him, remains substan-
tially true in Virginia.
CONCLUSION
The wrongful death statutes of most states provide for unlimited
recoveries and allow damages to be assessed on the basis of a showing
of loss of money and support by the decedent's beneficiaries. This the-
ory insures an adequate recovery whenever the financial supporter of
a family is killed by the wrongful act of another, but leaves no grounds
upon which to base recovery for the wrongful death of others. The
courts have been forced to broaden the meaning of pecuniary loss in
order to find a basis for recoveries in such cases.
Virginia, conversely, in its solace provision, insures the possibility of a
substantial recovery in all wrongful death cases through its solace provi-
sion, but places a limitation on the amount recoverable for pecuniary loss
which could easily result in an inadequate recovery where the decedent
is the family breadwinner. The jury's latitude and discretion in award-
ing recoveries for solace are almost unbounded considering the degree
of speculation inherent in such an award. For this reason and because
the solace provision is becoming the "backbone" of recovery in a ma-
jority of wrongful death cases, there should be further requirements of
proof imposed upon the claimant, such as proof of close emotional
ties or a showing of more than an ordinary amount of grief, imposed
upon the claimant. Otherwise the probable result is that the jury will
give this award a punitive aspect and increase the recovery commen-
surate with the defendant's degree of culpability.
All logic suggests the abolition of a limitation on the amount of pecu-
niary loss damage which can be recovered. Even if the amount awarded
is a net recovery, which it seldom is, there are many cases in which the
100. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133
(1961).
101. Chapman, Should Compensation in Wrongful Death Actions Be Limited?,
50 ILL. BJ. 782 (1962).
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limited amount is insufficient to sustain the surviving family. The pe-
cuniary loss recovery is already protected from false claims by the
dependency requirement. Thus it would seem that dependents should
be able to recover the damages which they can prove with reasonable
certainty. In addition to financial support, this should include any loss
of training and guidance of which a child can reasonably prove he has
been deprived by the death of a parent, and any loss of domestic services
including care of his home and children of which a husband can reason-
ably prove he has been deprived by the death of his wife.
